Technological University Dublin

ARROW@TU Dublin
Articles

Institute for Minority Entrepreneurship

2009-01-01

Entrepreneurial Teams: Comparing High-growth Software Firms
through Structure and Strategy
Thomas Cooney
Dublin Institute of Technology, thomas.cooney@tudublin.ie

Follow this and additional works at: https://arrow.tudublin.ie/imeart
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Cooney, T. (2009) Entrepreneurial Teams:Comparing High-Growth Software Firms Through Structure and
Strategy. Management Research News, Vol. 32, no.6. doi:10.1108/01409170910963000

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Institute for Minority Entrepreneurship at ARROW@TU
Dublin. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
an authorized administrator of ARROW@TU Dublin. For
more information, please contact
arrow.admin@tudublin.ie, aisling.coyne@tudublin.ie.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 4.0 License

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0140-9174.htm

Entrepreneurial teams

MRN
32,6

Comparing high-growth software firms
through structure and strategy
580

Thomas M. Cooney
Dublin Institute of Technology, Faculty of Business, Dublin, Ireland
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore hypothesis that high-growth firms founded by
entrepreneurial teams use a unique combination of organic structure and emergent strategy.
Design/methodology/approach – A quantitative study of 445 software development firms in the
USA and 219 firms in Ireland was undertaken with a valid response rate of 22 per cent and 38 per cent,
respectively.
Findings – Generally, all classifications of firms in the USA and in Ireland demonstrated a
combination of organic structure and emergent strategy at the beginning of their existence. As the US
firms grew older they moved towards a combination of organic structure and deliberate strategy, while
Irish firms moved towards a combination of mechanical structure and deliberate strategy that was
hierarchical and organised.
Research limitations/implications – The survey was conducted in only one industry and some
firm classifications had small cell sizes.
Practical implications – The ambition of this study was to offer owner-managers an evidence-based
structure/strategy combination that would support the attainment of high-growth.
Originality/value – This was the first occasion that the concept of a combination of structure and
strategy was explored as an explanation for high-growth amongst firms founded by entrepreneurial
teams.
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Introduction
The evidence of a positive relationship between entrepreneurial teams and highgrowth firms has been building over the past three decades, Watson et al. (1995)
highlighted that the literature was still focused primarily on the individual. However,
in more recent years, some investigations into the relationship between entrepreneurial
teams and performance have emerged through writers such as Birley and Stockley
(2000), Vyakarnam and Handelberg (2005) and Vanaelst et al. (2006) who highlighted
the advantages of combining talents to create and advance an enterprise. However,
given the body of evidence suggesting that high-growth firms are positively linked to
entrepreneurial teams (Cooper and Bruno, 1977; Obermayer, 1980; Teach et al., 1986;
EFER, 1995; Thakur, 1999; Littunen and Tohmo, 2003), it has been surprising that a
greater body of research has not been undertaken on this topic. This article challenges
the orthodoxy of entrepreneurship as a solo practice and investigates the relationship
between high-growth firms founded by entrepreneurial teams and the combinations of
structure and strategy that they employ. The work analyses software firms both in the
USA and in Ireland, thereby offering additional depth and insight to the findings. The
ultimate ambition of the work is to identify a unique coupling of structure and strategy
that is utilised by successful entrepreneurial teams, thereby offering those that follow a
greater prospect of attaining high-growth, no matter what country a firm might have
its origins.

Understanding entrepreneurial teams
While it is some years now since Bird (1989) suggested that research concerning
entrepreneurial teams was sparse and largely anecdotal, the study of entrepreneurial
teams remains a relatively recent phenomenon and arguably still without great insight.
One of the earliest definitions on the term ‘‘entrepreneurial team’’ was presented by
Kamm et al. (1990) who stated that an entrepreneurial team consisted of two or more
individuals who jointly establish a business in which they have equal financial interest.
In later years, Cooper and Daily (1997) suggested that an entrepreneurial team involved
a shared commitment to a new venture, Katzenbach (1997) proposed that what must be
shared is accountability, while Cohen and Bailey (1997) advocated that entrepreneurial
teams were a group of individuals who shared independent tasks and outcomes for
these tasks. Following a comprehensive review of definitions on entrepreneurial teams,
Schjoedt (2002) defined it as follows:
An entrepreneurial team consists of two or more persons who have an interest, both financial
and otherwise, in and commitment to the venture’s future and success; whose work is
interdependent in the pursuit of common goals and venture success; who are accountable to
the entrepreneurial team and for the venture; who are considered to be at the executive level
with executive responsibility in the early phases of the venture, including founding and prestart up; and who are seen as a social entity by themselves and by others.

While the debate on the challenge of identifying a definition for the term
‘‘entrepreneurial team’’ could continue unabated for some time, a definition had to be
used for operational purposes in this study, and the one selected was that highlighted
by Cooney (2005) whereby an entrepreneurial team was defined as:
Two or more individuals who have a significant financial interest and participate actively in
the development of the enterprise.

The purpose of ‘‘significant financial interest’’ was due to the recognition that only
sporadically would it occur that all partners would have equal financial interest, and it
also eliminated those who have invested small sums of money since they are unlikely to be
critical constituents of the team. The question of what constitutes ‘‘significant’’ is not fully
defined and can only be interpreted satisfactorily within a specific context. The intent of
the phrase ‘‘participate actively’’ was designed to eliminate sleeping or silent partners (i.e.
those who invest capital but do not involve themselves beyond seeking a return on their
investment). Additionally, the definition excluded venture capital firms, banks, and other
investment institutions since it was only concerned with individuals. The definition
provided here offers a clear understanding of what is meant by the term ‘‘entrepreneurial
team’’ and is utilised as the standard interpretation of the term throughout the remainder
of this work comparing high-growth firms in the software industry.
It is arguable that high-growth firms can be detected in any industry. However, the
literature implies that high-growth firms are most likely to be found in growth
industries (Vesper, 1990; Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). For the purposes of this research,
the industry selected was the software industry as this market was experiencing
growth in the selected countries of study and the industry had already been the subject
of studies on team foundations that would make deeper comparisons possible.
Nevertheless, some concerns about the work had also been identified since a number
of writers believed that the link between structure, strategy, industry and performance
was weak. Carter et al. (1992) had expressed surprise that strategy did not directly
predict new venture survival, although they did find significant strategy/industry
interactions in some industries, while Fombrun and Wally (1989) discovered that
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contrary to expectations, the relationship between strategy and structure failed to
demonstrate a significant effect on the levels of performance of the enterprises
scrutinised in their work. However, following considerable deliberation at the conclusion
to the first phase of the research, it was determined that while being cognisant of these
concerns, the literature review had identified an opportunity to analyse the structures
and strategies employed by high-growth firms in the software industry.
Identifying appropriate structural configurations
As this study was an examination of the relationship between entrepreneurial teams,
high-growth firms and the structures and strategies that they employed, the initial
construct theorising focused on issues of organisational structure in the context of an
evolving environment. Systems theorists such as Wiener (1948) and Katz and Kahn
(1966) argued that organisations are continuously altering processes between the firm
and the environment, necessitating complex multidimensional models concerning
cause and effect relationships. Blau and Scott (1962) indicated that all firms include an
informal element which correlated with the formal structure, while Thompson (1967)
talked of ‘‘pooled, sequential, and reciprocal organisational coupling’’. ‘‘Modern’’
structural theorists (e.g. Bolman and Deal, 1984) remained true to the classical concept
of efficiency although attracted by the neo-classical, behavioural and systems
approaches. Organisational ecology theorists such as Hanan and Freeman (1977),
Covin and Slevin (1991) and Zahra (1993) examined integrated firm level behaviour
with firm level performance and the external environment, but this approach runs
contra to the doctrine of rational sanction because its outcomes are attributed to chance
or fortune, which by definition cannot be managed. Meanwhile, contingency theorists
such as Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Kast and Rosenzweig (1973) and Pfeffer (1982)
took the view that there was no one best universal structure but instead emphasised
the need for flexibility. While the merits of each of these perspectives could be
vigorously debated, they do highlight how the overall philosophy of organisational
structures has softened from the ‘‘scientific management’’ era of Taylor (1911) to the
more modern notion of individual contingent composition.
Burns and Stalker (1961) analysed 20 industrial firms in the UK and the effects of
the external environment on their pattern of management and economic performance.
They distinguished five different kinds of environments ranging from ‘‘stable’’ to ‘‘least
predictable’’ and they also identified two divergent systems of management practice
and structure that were ‘‘mechanistic’’ and ‘‘organic’’. According to Burns and Stalker,
the mechanistic system was a more rigid structure and was more appropriate to stable
conditions whose characteristics are similar to those of bureaucracy, while the organic
system was a more fluid structure appropriate to changing conditions and unforeseen
circumstances that constantly arise, requiring actions outside defined roles. The
location of authority in an organic system is by consensus, and the lead is taken by that
person who is seen as most informed and capable. However, while firms are not
hierarchical they are stratified. Commitment to goals is greater in the organic system
and it becomes more difficult to distinguish between the formal and informal
organisation. Also, the development of shared beliefs in the values and goals of organic
systems are contrasted sharply with the monitoring of performance in the mechanistic
system. The relationship between the mechanistic and organic system is not rigid
according to Burns and Stalker, and an organisation moving between a relatively
stable and changing environment may also move between the two systems. Thus the
relationship is elastic and may oscillate between both forms. Each system is

appropriate to its own set of conditions and neither is proffered as being superior
under all circumstances. Burns and Stalker clearly stated that nothing in their
experience justified that the mechanistic system should be superseded by the organic
system in times of stability.
The Burns and Stalker (1961) paradigm of organic/mechanistic dimensions was
considered most apt for this study since it argued that a firm could move between these
points depending upon its circumstances. High-growth firms in quickly changing
environments should be organic, but as the firm grows or the environment stabilises it
may move to a more mechanical format, although it can also move back again if
conditions alter. These firms differ from non-high-growth firms because of the need to
adapt quickly which the organic system allows them to do more easily. Burns and
Stalker would argue that bureaucratic organisations cannot adjust to environmental
fluctuations in such a manner. Why teams and not individuals? As firms established
by lone entrepreneurs grow, they need to employ additional expertise at management
level. The introduction of these managers begets roles, responsibilities and inevitably,
hierarchy. To quote Olson (1987): ‘‘entrepreneurs often fail to move from a loose,
informally run business to one which employs second level managers and a more
formal system of planning, or organising, and control. Without these changes it can be
extremely difficult to survive the growth phase’’. But entrepreneurial teams will not
require such changes as the founders will already have the expertise within themselves
and therefore as the firm grows the new people whom they employ will be positioned
about them to support their activities in the organic configuration that has existed
since the beginning. Therefore the first hypothesis is that:
H1.

High-growth firms led by entrepreneurial teams in the software development
industry use an organic structure.

The basis for this philosophy pivots on the capacity of the firm to structurally realign
itself to the environment as promoted by the contingency theorists.
Selecting the pertinent strategy
In selecting an appropriate strategy model for this study, the issue of whether structure
follows strategy (Chandler, 1962) or strategy follows structure (Peters, 1992) inevitably
arose. In the literature, Williamson (1975) took the view that strategy needed to be
resolved first, and that the organisational structure followed thereafter. Whittington
(1993) believed that the Classical and the Evolutionary approaches that structure
follows strategy were too simplistic. He suggested that the Systemic approach was to
be sensitive to context, and the Processual approach was not to expect the relationship
between structure and strategy to follow the neat sequential logic of the Classicists.
Whatever the optimal theoretical base might be, Whittington argued that the matching
of strategy with structure was clearly critical to a firm’s performance. Lynch (1997)
discerned five main criticisms to the ‘‘strategy follows structure’’ process and asserted
that the type of structure is as equally important as the business area in developing a
strategy, and that the structures may be too rigid and bureaucratic in a rapidly
changing environment. He also argued that the role of top and middle management in
the formation of strategy needed to be reassessed, while Hammond (1994) propounded
that top-level executives were generally unable to formulate strategy by themselves,
thus necessitating strategy formulation becoming a process involving multiple levels
of the firm. Hofer (1975) saw a significant relationship between strategy and the
contingency theories of business, enabling the development of decisions during
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changes in the life cycle, or when any other variables in the environment alter. By
extension this would lead to the continual revaluation of appropriate structural
configurations.
But does engendering a flexible, free flowing, adaptive organisation necessarily lead to
chaos and lack of planning? One could argue that there is no justification for a ready-fireaim approach while also suggesting that entrepreneurs should play with and explore
ideas, letting their strategies evolve through a seamless process of guesswork, analysis
and action. This viewpoint leads to the question of whether strategy should be deliberate
or emergent, or can entrepreneurial activity be both. It can be deliberate in the sense that a
clear direction or challenge has been established by the chief executive, and emergent in
the sense that the details of the actions are seldom planned far in advance. Mintzberg
(1989) saw deliberate and emergent strategies as forming two poles of a continuum along
which one would expect real-world strategies to fall. Mintzberg argued that strategies
could form as well as be formulated, that they could appear without clear intentions and
converge into patterns. He postulated that a primary difference between these two
alternatives is the willingness to learn; deliberate strategy prohibits learning once the
strategy is devised while emergent strategy nurtures it.
For a high-growth firm to thrive it must be able to respond quickly to environmental
changes, particularly if it participates in a rapidly changing market (e.g. software
development). Whereas an entrepreneurial team might desire an emergent strategy,
a high-growth market will demand it. Therefore, while long-range planning in the
software industry is considered one year in advance, it nevertheless needs to be
constantly evolving and subject to change. The second hypothesis therefore is:
H2.

High-growth firms led by entrepreneurial teams in the software development
industry will use emergent strategies.

Whilst a software company needs to have a blueprint of its future, it must also be
capable of responding and reacting to changing customer needs, be sensitive to market
revision, and be understanding of both evolution and fluidity within their strategic
thinking. As highlighted above, it is the proposal of this study that software
development firms founded by entrepreneurial teams are in a particularly strong
position to achieve these characteristics.
Research methodology
The principal objective of this study was to determine what structures and strategies
were employed by high-growth firms founded by entrepreneurial teams. The study
concentrated on the software development industry for a number of reasons: the large
number of studies already carried out in this area; the above average incidences of highgrowth firms and entrepreneurial teams; and the growth of the industry sector generally.
Initially two industry experts were interviewed, as well as three academic experts, so as
to build a profile of the industry. Additionally six CEOs of software development firms
were selected randomly and in-depth interviews were held with them ascertaining their
viewpoints regarding the hypotheses developed from the literature review. These diverse
backgrounds enabled a fine-tuning of the theoretical base to be completed before
undertaking a postal survey to test the propositions. Additionally, through the work of
Burns and Stalker (1961) and Mintzberg (1989) highlighted earlier, a structure strategy
configuration was developed. The basic supposition engendered from this work was that
high-growth firms led by entrepreneurial teams in the software development industry

uniquely employed organic structures coupled with emergent strategies, as positioned in
Figure 1.
One of the central arguments to the research was that because the software
development industry was growing rapidly (with products having an increasingly
shorter lifecycle), there would be a compulsion for firms in the industry to move with
alacrity. It was then theorised that firms founded by entrepreneurial teams could do
this more effectively since they had a looser structure and a more diffuse base of skills
from inception, and that through group dynamics they could generate a broader range
of strategies for adoption. Given previous studies on the success of entrepreneurial
teams, research indicated that the combination of two or more entrepreneurs would
thereby offer a greater possibility of high-growth being achieved within such an
industry, although it was not suggested within this proposition that this tenet would be
equally valid for all industry environments. For the purposes of this study, highgrowth was defined as the ability to grow (in terms of people employed) above industry
averages over the lifetime of the firm. Those firms that achieved high-growth in the
short term, before once again declining, were not considered high-growth firms.
The first survey was undertaken in the USA and it was later repeated in Ireland. A
number of parameters were set in order to target the list of appropriate firms for the
survey more effectively: companies could be no more than ten years old ( because of
memory decay and rapid market obsolescence); its head office had to be based locally
(i.e. it was not a subsidiary or part of a major company whose central office was
elsewhere); and it was a private company (earlier in-depth interviews had revealed that
public companies behaved differently in terms of structure and strategy). This process
generated a valid population of 420 firms in the USA and 219 firms in Ireland. A valid
response of 93 firms (22 per cent) was received in the USA and 77 firms (35 per cent) in
Ireland. The firms were classified according to the number of founding members in the
firm and by growth in employment as follows: High-growth firms founded by
individuals, High-growth firms founded by teams, Non-high-growth firms founded by
individuals, Non-high-growth firms founded by teams.
The questionnaire used a five-point Likert scale which enabled scores to be
compiled for each firm’s structure and strategy, and these scores meant that each firm
could then have its position plotted onto Figure 1. Furthermore, it allowed aggregated
scores to be developed for each of the four firm classifications identified in the study
and these were also plotted onto Figure 1, thereby enabling simple diagrammatical
comparisons to take place. Additionally, because the questions were concerned both
with the starting position of the firm and its present position, it was possible to track
the progress of each firm (and classification) over time. The use of the Likert scale in
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Figure 2.
Movement of US vs Irish
firms

section 3 of the questionnaire permitted the identification of the most popular growth
strategies utilised by the different firm classifications. Sections 4 and 5 of the
questionnaire were used to help classify each firm.
Discussion
Possibly the most interesting finding to emerge from the survey was the difference
between the movements of the US firms over time in comparison to Irish firms. Figure 2
broadly exhibits how this shift occurred.
Generally, both the US and the Irish firms (of whatever classification) demonstrated
a combination of organic structure and emergent strategy at the beginning of their
existence. It is arguable that the business culture of the software industry is informal,
and since the industry is growing quickly, firms must be flexible and fluid. This could
explain why most firms in the surveys began with a combination of organic structure
and emergent strategy. Additionally, the software industry is frequently concerned
with writing programs and inventiveness for tailored product or service offerings. Such
innovation requires an environment that is loose rather than hierarchical. Production
lines are not a common feature of this industry and thus hierarchical structures are less
appropriate. Possibly no structure/strategy combination other than organic/emergent
was considered effective or even pertinent for the software industry. The organic/
emergent combination could also be a function of the product-market choice, although
this possibility was not strongly evident in the findings.
As the US firms grew older they moved towards a combination of organic structure
and deliberate strategy. But Irish firms, beginning in the same position, moved towards
a combination of mechanistic structure and deliberate strategy that was both
hierarchical and organised. This may be explained by cultural and economic
differences that reveal divergent entrepreneurial goals and ambitions. In-depth
interviews earlier in the study had revealed that the lead entrepreneurs of the highgrowth US firms frequently had a mindset that was focused on the firm eventually
going public, from which they gain make substantial monetary rewards. To achieve
this success, they generally offered many of their employees equity stakes and thus
made them co-owners of the ambition. The lead entrepreneurs of Irish firms were more
concerned with building ventures that were successful but over which they retained
complete ownership. Irish entrepreneurs were less willing to offer equity to others,
including employees and venture capitalists. This meant that as Irish firms grew in
terms of employee numbers, the structures would become more hierarchical. This is
possibly the result of differing cultures, but it may also be a function of the different

capital markets. In Massachusetts, the capital markets are very strong and there exists
ample opportunity to go public. In Ireland, the capital markets are relatively small and
there is limited potential for generating large wealth from going public. A significant
finding from the surveys is that while Ireland’s software industry is thriving and
receiving world recognition, it is not a smaller version of the USA, nor will the
combinations that are effective in the USA necessarily work in Ireland.
When examining the contrast between firms established by entrepreneurial teams
and firms established by individuals, it was striking how strongly they differed
between the surveys undertaken in the USA and in Ireland. Both of these firm
classifications had an organic/emergent combination to begin with in the USA, but
while firms founded by teams remained in that quadrant, firms founded by individuals
moved to the organic/deliberate quadrant. However, the movement on the Irish survey
was quite different. Firms founded by teams began in the organic/emergent quadrant
but proceeded to the deliberate/mechanistic quadrant. Meanwhile, firms founded by
individuals begin in the emergent/deliberate quadrant (the only classification to do so)
and stayed within that quadrant.
The distinctions between the various firm classifications were also analysed and
attention was given to the contrasting profiles in both regions surveyed. The primary
differences for the firm classifications for each region were as follows:
.

Firms founded by entrepreneurial teams – firms founded by entrepreneurial
teams in Massachusetts encouraged the day-to-day decisions to be made by
those with the greatest knowledge on that area, and strategies were encouraged
to come from anywhere within the organisation. However, firms founded by
entrepreneurial teams in Ireland relied on being fluid and team based but were
less focused regarding product and service offerings.

.

Firms founded by individuals – firms founded by individuals in Massachusetts
had little export activity, a managed process towards disseminating strategies,
and differentiation was the primary growth strategy. But firms founded by
individuals in Ireland were less focused regarding product and service offerings,
the CEO determined the strategies, and they had a high percentage of firms
exporting between 10 per cent and 50 per cent of their sales.

.

High-growth firms – high-growth firms in Massachusetts had a strong sense of
focus regarding the product or service offering, they targeted growing market
segments, increasingly shared information and advice, their strategies evolved
from throughout the organisation, and the Finance function became ever more
important. High-growth firms in Ireland by contrast had a broad ‘‘company
focus’’ and ‘‘product mix’’, their principal growth strategy was attention to the
needs of the customer, they were highly export orientated, and they had a strong
presence in sales.

.

Non-high-growth firms – non-high-growth firms in Massachusetts and in
Ireland operated across a wide range of activities, their functional
responsibilities were organic, and attention to customer needs was the primary
growth strategy. Where the non-high-growth firms of both regions differed was
in strategy, as strategies in the US firms were continuously emerging, but in
Ireland they were predominantly determined by the CEO.

The high-growth firms of the surveys were heavily committed to sharing information
and advice, and their strategies could come from anywhere in the organisation.
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Meanwhile, the non-high-growth firms were more willing to have looser functional
responsibilities for their employees, but the CEO was the principal strategic decisionmaker. Firms founded by teams gave authority to the person with the greatest
knowledge and the strategy could come from anywhere in the organisation (although
in Ireland it was a managed process). Firms founded by individuals were again more
willing to have looser functional responsibilities for their employees, and the strategy
process was either managed or the CEO determined the strategy. The growth
strategies were influenced by location rather than by classification, with firms in the
US targeting growing market segments, while firms in Ireland concentrated on
attention to customer needs. US high-growth firms and US firms founded by
entrepreneurial teams had a focused approach to their product or service offerings, but
all other classifications employed a wider range of activity. Irish firms had a high
percentage of sales from export, while US firms founded by individuals showed a low
percentage of sales from export. US firms placed a strong emphasis on the Engineering
function, and high-growth firms were highly likely to bring on a Finance person as the
firm matured. Irish firms placed a stronger emphasis on operations at the beginning
and sales as the firms get older. Overall, the findings suggested a greater need by Irish
firms to get organised in a structured, formal, hierarchical fashion as the firm matured.
The overall comparison between the US and Irish firms was that US firms were
more willing to share information and advice, encouraged decisions to be made by
those with the greatest knowledge in that area, had a focused approach to products and
services, and targeted growing market segments. In contrast, Irish firms exported a
much higher percentage of its sales, became more hierarchical as the firm matured,
were less willing to incorporate the employees in strategic decision making, had a
broad product and service approach, and placed a great emphasis on attention to
customer needs. The broad product and service approach was possibly a result of the
need to attract a wide variety of small customers at the beginning of the firm’s
existence in order to survive, and thereafter one could start to focus or differentiate in a
more targeted fashion. The same was not true of US firms because a niche market
could still attract large numbers due to the size of the population.
Conclusion
This paper explored and analysed the data generated from the questions asked of the
software firms in Massachusetts and in Ireland. The principal findings were that:
.

High-growth firms founded by entrepreneurial teams do not display a unique
coupling of organic structure and emergent strategy.

.

All classifications of firms (with the exception of Irish firms founded by teams)
began with an organic/emergent combination.

.

The movement of firms over time was divergent, with US firms moving towards
an organic/deliberate combination, while Irish firms moved towards a
mechanistic/deliberate combination.

.

Firms founded by entrepreneurial teams in the USA (whether high-growth or
non-high-growth) were the only firms to remain within the organic/emergent
quadrant at both ‘‘start-up’’ and ‘‘now’’.

While these were the primary highlights, a number of other interesting results were
additionally gathered.

The finding that unique combinations of structure and strategy were not observed
among high-growth firms in the software industry of either country suggests the need
to examine other factors that might explain the accelerated growth of organisations. It
may be that the descriptors of structure as mechanistic and organic, and strategy as
deliberate and emergent, are over simplified. Other dimensions of structure and
strategy which offer greater complexity and calibration may be more fruitful. For
example, Whittington (1993) argued that to consider strategic processes alone, whether
deliberate or emergent, is not enough and that outcomes of strategy are also relevant.
These outcomes may be conventional profit maximisation or may be more pluralistic
in nature, even in the case of a for-profit organisation. A perspective offering pluralistic
outcomes may well be more appropriate for high-growth firms in the software
industry, particularly those founded by entrepreneurial teams.
The concern of the research analysis moved away from high-growth firms founded
by entrepreneurial teams, and instead gave prominence to the differences between
high-growth firms and non-high-growth firms, and between firms founded by
entrepreneurial teams and firms founded by individuals. The principal lessons gained
from studying high-growth firms were about sharing and inclusiveness. Whether the
analysis concerned the structural configuration of the firm or its strategy formation,
high-growth firms would inform their entire organisation of what was happening and
look for opinion and contribution from the employees. It was this attitude of
partnership, and togetherness in the growth of a venture, that separated this
classification from all other firms. This attitude of sharing was not as strong in highgrowth Irish firms as there still remained a residue of the desire by Irish entrepreneurs
to retain control of their company.
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